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Abstract
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to
lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes
with another (envy-free). Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied exten-
sively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both. We are interested in those allocations for
which there exist payments such that the resulting mechanism is simultaneously incentive compatible
and envy-free.
Cyclic monotonicity is a characterization of incentive compatible allocations, local efficiency is a
characterization for envy-free allocations. We combine the above to give a characterization for allo-
cations which are both incentive compatible and envy free. We show that even for allocations that
allow payments leading to incentive compatible mechanisms, and other payments leading to envy free
mechanisms, there may not exist any payments for which the mechanism is simultaneously incentive
compatible and envy-free. The characterization that we give lets us compute the set of Pareto-optimal
mechanisms that trade off envy freeness for incentive compatibility.
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1 Introduction
We consider allocation problems, where a set U of objects should be allocated among m agents, each having
a valuation function vi assigning a value to every bundle. We wish to find a partition of the objects among the
agents so as to achieve some goal. Typically, this goal is to maximize (or approximate) the social welfare,
i.e., the sum of the agents’ valuations for their bundles. A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is a protocol that receives
the set of the agents’ valuations as input and returns a tuple consisting of an allocation a and payments p for
the agents. The utility of an agent is the sum of valuations of the items minus any payments (quasi-linear
utility).
Two natural desired properties of any mechanism are incentive compatibility and envy-freeness. A
mechanism is incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report her private infor-
mation truthfully [5]. In 1987, Rochet [9] defined the notion of a cycle-monotonic allocation, and proved
that this was a necessary and sufficient condition of an IC-implementable allocation – an allocation having
associated payments that jointly form an incentive compatible mechanism. A mechanism is envy-free if no
agent wishes to switch her outcome with that of another [2, 3, 10, 6, 7, 11]. The notion of locally efficient al-
location has been defined by Haake et. al. [4] who showed that this was a necessary and sufficient condition
of an EF-implementable allocation – allocation having associated payments that jointly form an envy-free
mechanism.
While much work has been done on each of these properties independently, not much is yet understood
about the interrelation between incentive compatibility and envy freeness The interaction between these two
notions is the focus of our paper.
Our contribution is a characterization of allocations that are both incentive compatible and envy-free. We
use this to derive various Pareto-optimal mechanisms that trade off envy freeness for incentive compatibility,
we also use this to obtain negative results and to show separation results for different types of allocations
and problems.
1.1 Envy-Free and Incentive-Compatible Allocations
Motivated by the cyclic monotonicity characterization of [9] and the locally efficient characterization of [4]
we now consider two new categories of allocation functions:
EF ∪ IC-implementable: An allocation function a is called incentive compatible or envy-free imple-
mentable (EF ∪ IC-implementable) if there exists a payment function p such that M = 〈a, p〉 is
incentive compatible and a (possibly different) payment function p′ such that M = 〈a, p′〉 is envy-
free.
EF ∩ IC-implementable: An allocation function a is incentive compatible and envy-free implementable
(EF ∩ IC-implementable) if there exists a payment function p such that the mechanism M = 〈a, p〉
is incentive compatible and envy-free. Clearly, every function which is EF ∩ IC-implementable is
also EF ∪ IC-implementable.
Many natural questions arise regarding the properties above: Are these classes identical? Empty? What
interesting problems fall into each of these classes? Figure 1 gives different payment functions for the social
welfare maximizing allocation of one indivisible item. It is easy to verify the properties claimed for the
various payment functions. The social welfare maximizing allocation is indeed EF ∩ IC , Clarke pivots
payments give a mechanism that is both incentive compatible and envy free (the third entry).
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Payments Properties
pi = minj 6=i vj
pj = mink 6=j vk − vi, for all j 6= i
Incentive compatible, not envy-free
(VCG, not Clarke pivot payments)
pi = 0
pj = −maxk 6=i vk
Envy-free, not incentive compatible
(not VCG)
pi = maxk 6=i vk
pj = 0, for all j 6= i
Envy-free and incentive compatible
(VCG with Clarke pivot payments)
Figure 1: Allocating a single item to the agent of highest valuation, (agent i), the utility of agent i is vi− pi,
the utility of agents j 6= i is −pj.
In Section 3 we provide a characterization for allocations that are EF ∩IC-implementable. We then use
the obtained characterization to derive some useful observations regarding the spectrum of “best possible”
tradeoffs between (approximate) envy-freeness and (approximate) incentive compatibility.
Finally, in Section 5 we explore the relationships between the different classes. In particular, we show
that not every IC-implementable allocation is also EF -implementable, and vice versa. Additionally, using
the characterization provided in Section 3, we show that not every IC ∪ EF -implementable allocation is
also IC ∩ EF -implementable.
2 Preliminaries
Let U be a set of objects, and associated with agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is a valuation function vi ∈ Vi that maps
sets of objects into ℜ. Let v =< v1, v2, . . . , vm > be a sequence of valuation functions, and let (v′i, v−i) be
the sequence of valuation functions arrived by substituting vi by v′i (v′i ∈ Vi) , i.e.,
(v′i, v
−i) =< v1, . . . , vi−1, v
′
i, vi+1, . . . , vm > .
An allocation function1 a maps a sequence of valuation functions v =< v1, v2, . . . , vm >, into a parti-
tion of U consisting of m parts, one for each agent. I.e.,
a(v) =< a1(v), a2(v), . . . , am(v) >,
where
⋃
i ai(v) = U and ai(v) ∩ aj(v) = ∅ for i 6= j. Let A denote the set of possible allocations. A
payment function6 is a mapping from v to ℜm, p(v) =< p1(v), p2(v), . . . , pm(v) >, pi(v) ∈ ℜ. Payments
are from the agent to the mechanism (if the payment is negative then this means that the transfer is from the
mechanism to the agent).
A mechanism is a pair of functions, M = 〈a, p〉, where a is an allocation function, and p is a payment
function. For a sequence of valuation functions v = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vm〉, the utility to agent i is defined as
vi(ai(v))− pi(v). Such a utility function is known as quasi-linear.
1Here we deal with indivisible allocations, although our results also extend to divisible allocations with appropriate modifica-
tions.
6In this paper we consider only deterministic mechanisms and can therefore omit the allocation as an argument to the payment
function.
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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: A celebrated result in mechanism design is the family of
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. A mechanism M = 〈a, p〉 is called a VCG mechanism if:
• a(v) ∈ argmaxa∈A
∑m
i=1 vi(ai(v)), and
• pi(v) = hi(v−i)−
∑
j 6=i vj(aj(v)), where hi does not depend on vi, i = 1, . . . ,m.
For all {hi}mi=1, the VCG mechanism is incentive compatible (See, e.g., [8]). The Clarke pivot payment
for a VCG mechanism takes
hi(v
−i) = max
a′∈A
∑
j 6=i
vj(a
′).
We next define mechanisms that are IC, EF, or both IC and EF.
• A mechanism is incentive compatible if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to reveal her true
valuation function to the mechanism. I.e., if for all i, v, and v′i:
vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥ vi(ai(v
′
i, v
−i))− pi(v
′
i, v
−i);
this is equivalent to:
pi(v) ≤ pi(v
′, v−i) +
(
vi(ai(v))− vi(ai(v
′
i, v
−i))
)
. (1)
• A mechanism is envy-free if no agent seeks to switch her allocation and payment with another. I.e., if
for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and all v:
vi(ai(v))− pi(v) ≥ vi(aj(v)) − pj(v);
this is equivalent to:
pi(v) ≤ pj(v) +
(
vi(ai(v))− vi(aj(v))
)
. (2)
• A mechanism (a, p) is incentive compatible and envy-free if (a, p) is both incentive compatible and
envy-free.
3 Characterizing Allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable
Before presenting our characterization for allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable, we present several
known characterizations.
Definition 3.1. (Locally Efficient([4])) An allocation function a is said to be locally efficient if for all v, and
all permutations pi of 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
j=1
vi(ai(v)) ≥
m∑
j=1
vi(api(i)(v)).
Theorem 3.2. ([4]) A necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation function a to beEF -implementable
is that a is locally efficient.
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Definition 3.3. (Cycle monotonicity [9]) We require Rochet’s notion of cyclic monotonicity : an allocation
function satisfies cycle monotonicity if for every player i, every integer K , and every v1i , v2i , . . . , vKi ∈ Vi,
we have
K∑
k=1
[
vki
(
ai(v
k
i , v
−i)
)
− vki
(
ai(v
k+1
i , v
−i)
)]
≥ 0 (3)
where vK+1i = v1i . Note that the summand is the same as the expression in Equation (1).
Theorem 3.4. ([9]) A necessary and sufficient condition that an allocation function is IC-implementable
is that it is cycle monotonic.
3.1 The Graph Ga
For an allocation function a, let Ga be a weighted digraph with vertices (i, v), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
v =< v1, . . . , vm > is a sequence of valuation functions.
The arcs of the graph are classified as either EF arcs or IC arcs as follows:
• EF arcs: For all v, all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, there is an arc from (j, v) to (i, v) of weight vi(ai(v)) −
vi(aj(v)).
• IC arcs: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, all v−i, all vi, and all v′i, there is an arc from (i, (v′i, v−i)) to (i, (vi, v−i))
of weight vi(ai(vi, v−i))− vi(ai(v′i, v−i)).
If we consider only EF arcs, then Ga consists of vertex disjoint complete digraphs, each of which
corresponds to a different v. An allocation is EF -implementable if and only if there are no negative cycles
of EF arcs in Ga. This is equivalent to the locally efficient characterization of Theorem 3.2.
If we consider only IC arcs, then Ga consists of vertex disjoint complete digraphs, each of which
corresponds to a different pair i and v−i. An allocation is IC-implementable if and only if there are no
negative cycles of IC arcs in Ga. This is equivalent to the cycle monotone characterization of incentive
compatible mechanisms of Theorem 3.4.
This suggests the following characterization of allocations that are EF ∩ IC-implementable:
Theorem 3.5. Allocation function a is incentive compatible and envy-free implementable (EF ∩ IC-
implementable) if and only if there are no negative cycles in Ga.
Proof. A mechanism (a, p) is EF and IC if and only if there exists a payment function
p(v) =< p1(v), p2(v), . . . pm(v) >
such that the following two conditions hold:
• For any IC arc e = ((i, v′), (i, v)), it holds that vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥ vi(ai(v′))− pi(v′);
which is equivalent to
vi(ai(v))− vi(ai(v
′)) ≥ pi(v)− pi(v
′).
• For any EF arc e = ((j, v), (i, v)), it holds that vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥ vi(aj(v)) − pj(v);
which is equivalent to
vi(ai(v))− vi(aj(v)) ≥ pi(v)− pj(v).
4
In Ga, w(e) = vi(ai(v)) − vi(ai(v′)) for an IC arc e = ((i, v′), (i, v)), therefore w(e) ≥ pi(v) − pj(v).
Similarly, w(e) = vi(ai(v))− vi(aj(v)) for an EF arc e = ((j, v), (i, v)), therefore w(e) ≥ pi(v)− pi(v′).
If we sum up these inequalities over the set of arcs forming a cycle (consisting of alternate IC and EF
arcs), we get that the sum of arc weights must be non-negative as the right hand sides cancel out.
If Ga does not contain a negative cycle, we can compute shortest paths from any arbitrary start vertex
(i, v), and interpret the length of the shortest path from (i, v) to a vertex (j, v′) as pj(v′). Shortest paths
obey the required condition.
It follows that an allocation is EF ∪ IC-implementable (potentially different payments for incentive
compatibility and for envy-freeness) if and only if all negative cycles in Ga include at least one EF arc
and at least one IC arc. Figure 2 (in Appendix 5) helps visualize Ga by illustrating a subgraph of a Ga that
contains a cycle of EF and IC arcs that is not a union of complete IC and EF cycles (this 8-node subgraph
is the smallest subgraph with this property.)
4 Trading Envy for Truthfulness
4.1 Tradeoffs between approximate envy-freeness and approximate incentive compatibility
A mechanism (a, p) has ∆-approximate envy-freeness if for all v, all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, vi(ai(v)) − pi(v) ≥
vi(aj(v)) − pj(v) − ∆ (no agent envies another by more than ∆). Similarly, (a, p) has ∆-approximate
incentive compatibility if no agent has incentive to lie that is larger than ∆, i.e. for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for all v
and v′i, vi(ai(v))− pi(v) ≥ vi(ai(v′i, v−i))− pj(v−i, v′i)−∆.
For a graph Ga as defined in Section 3.1 and a pair (cef , cic) of nonnegative values, we define G
+(cef ,cic)
a
to be such that cef is added to the weight of all EF arcs and cic is added to the weight of all IC arcs in Ga.
A pair (cef , cic) is cycle-correcting for Ga if G
+(cef ,cic)
a does not contain negative cycles. By comput-
ing shortest paths from an arbitrary node in G+(cef ,cic)a we obtain payments (and a mechanism) with cef -
approximate envy-freeness and cic-approximate incentive compatibility. A cycle-correcting pair (cef , cic) is
minimal if there is no cycle-correcting pair (x, y) 6= (cef , cic) such that x ≤ cef and y ≤ cic.
The set Ta of minimal cycle-correcting pairs defines a tradeoff between approximate envy-freeness and
approximate incentive compatibility of the allocation function a. If a is EF ∩ IC-implementable, then
Ta = {(0, 0)}. If a is EF -implementable (but not necessarily IC-implementable), there is a point of
the form (0, cic) ∈ Ta. The corresponding mechanism is envy-free and has the best possible (that is, cic-
approximate) incentive compatibility subject to envy-freeness. Similarly, if a is IC-implementable, there
is a point (cef , 0) ∈ Ta with a corresponding incentive compatible mechanism that has the best possible
(that is, cef -approximate) envy freeness subject to incentive compatibility. These “best” tradeoffs can be
computed in time polynomial in the size of Gf (minimum ratio cycles [1]).
4.2 Partition based on Trustworthiness
Assume that one can find either envy free or truthful prices, but not both. Then, one can find prices that
enforce envy freeness for some of the agents, and truthfulness for the complement, and can choose how to
classify the agents.
Consider the EF and IC arcs graph such that there are no negative cycles of only IC or only EF arcs, but
there might be a mixed cycle. In particular, any negative cycle must include a vertex where the arc entering
the vertex is an EF arc and the arc exiting the vertex is an IC arc.
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We do as follows: We remove all IC arcs entering (i,X) where i is trusted, and remove all EF arcs
entering (i,X) where i is untrusted. Any negative cycle must include both trusted and untrusted agents
(otherwise it is limited to edges of one type). There are no EF edges from trusted to untrusted vertices, and
IC edges only connect vertices associated with the same agent. Thus, there is no cycle including both trusted
and untrusted vertices.
It follows that no trusted agent will be envious, since envy is prevented by the incoming EF edges.
Likewise, no untrusted agent has incentive to lie, this is guaranteed by the incoming IC edges2.
5 Separation Examples
IC arc
EF arc
1, v01v
0
2
2, v01v
0
2
2, v01v
1
2
1, v01v
1
2
1, v11v
1
2
2, v11v
1
2
2, v11v
0
2
1, v11v
0
2
Figure 2: A cycle in Ga that includes two agents (1 and 2), and two valuation functions for each, {v01 , v11}
for agent 1, {v02 , v12} for agent 2. The valuation functions for all other agents are fixed in this cycle.
In this section we prove that not every allocation that is IC-implementable is also EF -implementable,
and vice versa. Additionally, we show that not every allocation that is IC ∪ EF -implementable is also
IC ∩ EF -implementable.
Claim 5.1. Not every allocation that is IC-implementable is also EF -implementable.
Proof. Consider a single item auction and give it to agent 1. If the mechanism pays nothing to any agent this
is incentive compatible. However, there is no payment function that makes this envy-free, this allocation is
not locally efficient (and thus not EF -implementable) unless agent 1 has the highest valuation.
2In fact, we could try to add more EF and IC edges, subject to there being no negative cycle, and get a wider set of envy/incentive-
compatibility constraints. We could combine this idea with that of increasing the remaining edges by some ∆, so as to get some
guarantees on the envy of the untrusted agents and the incentive to lie of the trusted agents.
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Claim 5.2. Not every allocation that is EF -implementable is also IC-implementable.
Proof. Consider a single divisible good. Let ai(v) = αi denote what fraction of the good is given to agent
i, where
∑m
i=1 αi = 1. For the examples below, we take the valuation function to be proportional, i.e., for
all i, vi(ai(v)) = αizi, zi is agent i’s value of the entire object.
Consider the following assignment function:
a(v1, v2) =


(1/2, 1/2) z1 = z2
(14 −
z1
2(z1+z2)
, 34 +
z1
2(z1+z2)
) z1 < z2
(34 +
z2
2(z1+z2)
, 14 −
z2
2(z1+z2)
) z1 > z2
This assignment is locally efficient, but the fraction assigned to an agent does not monotonically increase
with the agent valuation. This contradicts cyclic monotonicity (on a cycle of length 2).
Claim 5.3. Not every allocation that is IC ∪EF -implementable is also IC ∩ EF -implementable.
Proof. Consider a single divisible good and three agents {1, 2, 3} where each of the agents, 1 and 2, can
choose one of two specific valuation functions: Agent i = 1, 2, has valuation function vi ∈ {v0i , v1i }, and
agent 3 has only one valuation function, v3.
As before, let zji = v
j
i (1) (the valuation for the entire good). Consider a setting where z02 ≥ z12 > z01 ≥
z11 ≥ z3 . (For concreteness, take z3 = 0, z01 = z11 = 1, z02 = z12 = 2 for a divisible good and z3 = −3,
z01 = z
1
1 = −2, z
0
2 = z
1
2 = −1 for a divisible task.)
We denote ab1b2i ≡ ai(v
b1
1 , v
b2
2 , v3) and consider the allocation a111 = a112 = 0.4, a113 = 0.2 and for
b1b2 ∈ {00, 01, 10}, a
b1b2
1 = a
b1b2
2 = 0.5, a
b1b2
3 = 0.
We show that a is IC-implementable (all IC cycles in Ga are nonnegative). Any IC cycle must involve
one of the agents {1, 2} (agent 3 can not change valuations) and the two valuations of this agent. There are
four IC cycles (2-cycles) with weights, for b1b2 ∈ {0, 1},:
(a0b2
1
− a1b2
1
) · (z0
1
− z1
1
) ≥ 0
(ab10
2
− ab11
2
) · (z0
2
− z1
2
) ≥ 0
(Using the property that for any agent i ∈ {1, 2}, fixing the valuation of other agents, the fraction allocated
is nondecreasing with valuation (weak monotonicity).)
One could argue directly that all EF cycles in Ga are nonnegative and therefore a is EF -implementable.
It is easier to see that a is locally efficient. The two agents 1 and 2 always receive the same fraction and
agent 3, whose valuation is smaller, receives a smaller fraction.
We now show that Ga has a negative cycle, and therefore, using Theorem 3.5, a is not EF ∩ IC-
implementable. Consider the 8-cycle C8 (see Figure 2) over players 1, 2 and valuations (vb11 , vb22 , v3) for
b1b2 ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. The weight of C8 is
w(C8) = (a
00
1
− a00
2
) · z0
1
+ % EF arc (2, v0
1
v0
2
)→ (1, v0
1
v0
2
)
(a00
2
− a01
2
) · z0
2
+ % IC arc (2, v0
1
v1
2
)→ (2, v0
1
v0
2
)
(a01
2
− a01
1
) · z1
2
+ % EF arc (1, v0
1
v1
2
)→ (2, v0
1
v1
2
)
(a01
1
− a11
1
) · z0
1
+ % IC arc (1, v1
1
v1
2
)→ (1, v0
1
v1
2
)
(a11
1
− a11
2
) · z1
1
+ % EF arc (2, v1
1
v1
2
)→ (1, v1
1
v1
2
)
(a11
2
− a10
2
) · z1
2
+ % IC arc (2, v1
1
v1
2
)→ (2, v1
1
v0
2
)
(a10
2
− a10
1
) · z0
2
+ % EF arc (1, v1
1
v0
2
)→ (2, v1
1
v0
2
)
(a10
1
− a00
1
) · z1
1
% IC arc (1, v0
1
v0
2
)→ (1, v1
1
v0
2
)
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This cycle has two arcs with nonzero weights (the 4th and the 6th arcs) and has weight w(C8) = 0.1(z01 −
z12) < 0.
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